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is interpreted as a design competition leading firms to make their products
more specific or more general with respect to consumers’ preferences, in
this paper the transportation cost competition is assimilated to a techno-
logical competition. Changes in transportation costs are seen as technolog-
ical changes associated to the customization process. Therefore, the pricing
strategies for customized products result from competition in the technology
of customization and from competition in final prices. The main result of
the paper is that this technological competition intensifies price competition
(consistently with the findings in the literature on innovation), leading to a
market configuration characterized by high concentration and low prices for
each variety of the customized good. In a sense the model may be seen as
an attempt to justify the observed phenomenon of mass-customization: a
few basic varieties of products are oﬀered, but in many versions and at low
prices.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the spatial framework
adopted in the model is briefly described. Section 3 analyses a three stage-
game in which, after profitable entry, firms engage a technological compe-
tition on customization costs and prices. This game is studied under two
alternative hypotheses on the choice of customization costs: in section 3.1
this is assumed to be costless, i.e. firms may choose diﬀerent customiza-
tion technologies without altering the production cost of the basic variety;
in section 3.2 this simplified assumption is relaxed, by positing that more
eﬃciency in customization requires higher set-up costs. In the same section
a brief discussion of the mass-customization phenomenon is also oﬀered.
Finally, some concluding remarks and comments are gathered in section 4.
2 The spatial framework
Competitive product diﬀerentiation under discriminatory pricing allows to
study product customization. As mentioned above, the standard spatial
model of price discrimination drawn from Thisse and Vives (1988) is used
on this purpose. In order to investigate the long run equilibrium generating
by a free-entry process, this framework is combined with the Salop model
(1979).
More specifically, I consider the market for a horizontally diﬀerentiated
product, whose characteristics may be represented as points of a circle. Con-
sumers are heterogeneous in preferences and uniformly distributed on this
circle whose length is normalized to 1. Firms are located symmetrically on
this characteristics space. In what follows a unit demand is assumed at all
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points of the circle. The product at firm i’s locations represent the basic
product of firm i, its basic variety, but the latter can be redesigned by the
firm in order to match the specific consumers’ requirements bearing a unit
constatnt customization cost ti, so that the total customization cost is as-
sumed to be linear in distance. In what follows, we shall call variety the
basic product oﬀered by the firm, and version the tailored product oﬀered at
each location. The parameter ti synthesizes the technological properties of
the customization activity or equivalently, according to Norman (2003) and
Thisse and Vives (1988), the variable cost of redesigning the base product.
The higher the technological parameter ti, the higher are the customization
costs incurred by the firm in the market.
We shall assume that each firm has access to a set of diﬀerent customiza-
tion technologies. This set is the same for all firms, which also share the same
information technology. The customization technology adopted by a firm is
always observable by its competitor. The competing firms are assumed to be
able to oﬀer individually tailored goods such that all the varieties of a basic
product are oﬀered; moreover they are assumed to be able to discriminate
perfectly among consumers, by setting a price schedule p (x) for each variety
depending on consumers’ location x, where x is the distance of a consumer
from the generic firm i. This price charged to the consumers includes the
cost associated with product customization, so that the mill price at each
location is the price corrected for the customization cost - the transportation
cost of adapting the firm’s base product to consumers’ needs.
In order to focus on the role of transportation costs, we assume that
the basic variety is produced at zero variable costs. However, firms bear a
set-up cost F to enter the market. This cost may be either constant and
independent of the customization cost, or decreasing in the latter. In the
first case the choice of a more eﬃcient customization technology is costless
for the firm; in the second eﬃciency in customization imposes higher set-up
costs.
3 Pricing customization
It is within the above framework that the following three-stage game is
analysed: firms are assumed to decide first their entry into the market, and
then to engage a customization cost competition and a price competition.
At each stage of the game firms’ choices are simultaneous. The game is
solved by backward induction. We solve first the price stage of the game,
then we deal with the optimal choice of the customization cost. The optimal
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